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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 This matter comes on before this Court in this 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 First Amendment action on plaintiff Daniel T. Galena‟s 
appeal from the District Court‟s orders entered on March 5, 
2010, vacating a jury‟s verdict in his favor, granting defendant 
  3 
Fiore Leone judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), and denying Galena‟s motions 
for an award of attorney‟s fees and costs.  In his amended 
complaint, Galena alleged that Leone, at a time that he was the 
chairperson of the Erie County, Pennsylvania, Council, the 
County‟s legislative body, violated his First Amendment rights 
to free speech and to petition the government by ejecting him 
from a Council meeting when Galena attempted to object to the 
Council‟s procedure in adopting an ordinance.  At the end of a 
two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in Galena‟s favor, and 
awarded him $5,000 in compensatory damages, as it found that 
Leone intended to suppress Galena‟s speech by reason of 
Galena‟s viewpoint or identity when he had Galena ejected from 
the meeting.  On Leone‟s post-trial motion, however, the Court 
vacated the verdict, and granted Leone judgment as a matter of 
law, as it held that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
liability verdict.  The Court also denied Galena‟s motions for 
attorney‟s fees and costs.  Inasmuch as we agree with the 
District Court that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
jury‟s finding that Leone‟s actions violated the First Amendment 
and section 1983, we will affirm the orders of March 5, 2010.   
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In 2006 Galena, a resident of Erie County, began 
attending meetings of the Erie County Council because of his 
interest in government and his desire to observe how the 
Council was spending public tax dollars.  The Council held 
meetings every two weeks and Galena estimates that between 
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early 2006 and March 20, 2007, he attended its meetings at least 
once a month.   
 The Council has adopted an Administrative Code that 
provides for the order of business at a typical Council meeting to 
be as follows: (1) Pledge of Allegiance; (2) Optional Prayer or 
Invocation; (3) Roll Call; (4) Hearing of the Public; (5) 
Approval of the Minutes of Previous Meetings; (6) Reports of 
County Officials, Committees, or Special Advisory Groups; (7) 
Unfinished Business; (8) New Business; and (9) Adjournment.
1
  
The Council permits members of the public to comment on any 
subject they wish to address during the Hearing of the Public 
portion of the meeting, allowing a speaker who has provided 
advance written notice of a desire to speak five minutes and a 
speaker who has not provided such advance notice three 
minutes.  The Council applies the Code to preclude a member of 
the public from speaking at any time during a Council meeting 
other than during the Hearing of the Public portion of the 
meeting.
2
  The Code provides that the presiding officer may bar 
                                                 
1
 There appear to be several repetitions in the pagination of the 
appendix.  There are two sections of pages labeled 127-130 and 
three sections labeled as 131-136.  We have renumbered the 
appendix to avoid confusion.  The second section of pages 
labeled 127-136 has become 137-146 and the third section 
labeled 131-136 has become 147-152.  The total number of 
pages in the appendix is 178.   
 
2
 The Administrative Code does not state that members of the 
public may speak only during the Hearing of the Public portion 
of Council meetings, but Leone, who participated in drafting the 
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a member of the public from the meeting if the individual 
becomes boisterous or makes offensive, insulting, threatening, 
insolent, slanderous, or obscene remarks. 
 The Council takes up the adoption of ordinances during 
the “New Business” portions of meetings in accordance with a 
formal procedure in the Code.  In this regard, the Code provides 
that proposed ordinances be introduced in writing, and, except 
for emergency ordinances, which may be adopted sooner, may 
be adopted at a meeting held at least one week after the meeting 
at which they were introduced.  The Code requires that all 
ordinances related to the levying of taxes, before being adopted, 
are to be read at least once in each of two separate meetings of 
the Council.   
 Galena has spoken during the Hearing of the Public 
portion of Council meetings approximately 14 or 15 times, 
primarily addressing Erie County‟s expenditure of tax revenues. 
 Galena testified that when speaking his custom has been to 
begin by stating his name and address to the Council, and then 
turning to the audience and greeting them by stating, “[G]ood 
evening taxpayers.”  App. at 26.  Next, his custom is to face the 
                                                                                                             
Code, and who by the time of the trial had served on the Council 
for 32 years, interprets the Code as imposing such a restriction.  
Though Galena does not contend that the Code provides for 
public comments other than during the Hearing of the Public, he 
contends that, regardless of the Code, members of the public 
may make objections under the Sunshine Act, a statute we 
discuss below, at times other than during that portion of 
meetings. 
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Council and, “more often than not, [he] . . . kind of pan[s] the 
seven members of County Council with [his] arm . . . and say[s] 
„good evening tax spenders.‟”  Id.  Galena testified that Leone, 
on hearing the latter greeting, often would “grimace and scowl.” 
 Id.  Galena also testified that while he was speaking, Leone 
would “more often than not . . . grin, and almost laugh” at his 
comments, though he did not react that way when other 
members of the public spoke.  Id. at 27. 
 This litigation arose from events at the March 20, 2007 
Council meeting.  During the Hearing of the Public portion of 
that meeting four members of the public addressed the Council: 
(1) Gil Rocco criticized the Council for its decision making 
process and for breaking the law by passing a ban on smoking in 
the county;
3
 (2) Renee Vendetti accused the Council of wasting 
money on trips to Washington D.C. and Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, and stated that the smoking ban was improper 
under Roberts Rules of Order and that those rules must be 
followed in the preparation of Council minutes; (3) Kenneth 
Francis Simon Przepierski stated that the smoking ban was a 
“smoke screen” so that the Council can “fly through agendas 
bumping first readings to second readings,” criticized the 
Council‟s tax exoneration of certain properties, and stated that 
the budget should be trimmed, id. at 141; and (4) Maria Foster 
stated that the Council was breaking the law in various ways and 
that it allowed the Office of Children and Youth to violate the 
                                                 
3
 We have examined the smoking ban ordinance, the Erie 
County Smokefree Air Act of 2006, Ordinance Number 178, 
2006, and note that it is not a county-wide ban on smoking but 
rather applies only in certain places within the County. 
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law even though the agency is under the Council‟s and the Erie 
County executive‟s4 jurisdiction.  Furthermore, Foster accused 
Council members of taking pleasure trips to Washington D.C. 
and receiving cash and extra perks.  All four persons spoke 
without interruption or other incident.   
 Following the Hearing of the Public, the Council 
approved the minutes of the previous meeting and received 
reports from various committees and Council members.  The 
minutes of the meeting recite that Leone then addressed the 
public comments regarding the smoking ban and also made the 
following statement: 
Mr. Leone then addressed Ms. 
Vendetti, Ms. Foster and Mr. 
Przepierski.  Mr. Leone keeps 
hearing that Council breaks the 
law.  He cautioned these 
individuals to be careful when they 
tell Council they want to be taken 
seriously; because Council should 
be taken seriously as well.  It seems 
that no matter what, some people 
cannot be pleased.  He recalled a 
story his father told him – if you 
pass out ten dollar bills, people will 
complain that they‟re not twenties, 
and he feels his father was probably 
right.  This seems to be the 
                                                 
4
 The County Executive apparently is the county administrator. 
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situation here; no matter what 
Council does, it just isn‟t enough.  
People think Council Members 
should be available 24 hours a day, 
doing everything they possibly can. 
 Although he probably puts in more 
time than other members, it is 
because Mr. Leone has the time.  
He reminded the audience that this 
is a part-time job.  Council 
Members are legislators, and 
Council is getting tired of some of 
the issues being brought up.  He 
again cautioned people to be 
careful, because, if necessary, 
Council will take the matter to 
court.   
App. at 144-45. 
 Next, the Council considered several ordinances.  During 
this consideration, a Council member made a motion to move a 
newly introduced ordinance from the first reading to a second 
reading.  At that point Galena and Leone had the following 
exchange: 
Mr. Leone: Next item, second 
reading of Ordinance 28, in its 
entirety, please. 
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Mr. Smith: Second reading of 
Ordinance Number 28, 2007, „Fifth 
2007 Public Health Fund Budget 
Supplemental Appropriation for 
Public Health Preparedness Grant.‟ 
(Mr. Smith reads ordinance body) 
Mrs. Loll: So moved. 
Mr. Mitchell:  Second. 
Mr. Leone: Moved by Mrs. Loll, 
seconded by Mr. Mitchell.  
Comments? 
Mr. Galena: Mr. Chairman, I have 
an objection . . .  
Mr. Leone:  (uses gavel) 
Mr. Galena: Mr. Chairman, I have 
an objection 
Mr. Leone: You‟re out of order. 
Mr. Galena: You are in violation . 
. . 
Mr. Leone: I said you‟re out of 
order, if you keep it up I‟ll have 
you taken out. 
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Mr. Galena: I object.  You are in 
violation of Pennsylvania Sunshine 
Act. 
Mr. Leone: Deputy, I want him 
taken out of here. 
Mr. Galena And Erie County‟s 
Administrative Code. 
Mr. Leone: And I want him 
charged. 
Mr. Galena: You are in violation 
of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act. 
Mr. Leone: I want him charged.  
Do you hear, that‟s harassment.  
You‟re not going to get away . . .  
Mr. Galena: I‟m part of the 
assembly, I object to your 
proceedings. 
Mr. Leone: We‟ll file charges 
against you. 
Mr. Galena: You‟re welcome to 
do so. 
Id. at 148. 
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 A sheriff‟s deputy then escorted Galena from the Council 
meeting and the building.  Notwithstanding Leone‟s comments 
at the meeting, neither Leone nor anyone else filed charges 
against Galena.  Leone, however, sent Galena a letter stating 
that, as chairperson of the Council, it was Leone‟s responsibility 
to maintain decorum and preserve order at Council meetings, 
and that if Galena disrupted meetings in the future he could be 
banned from Council meetings. 
 On April 30, 2007, Galena initiated this case by filing a 
complaint, later amended in March 2008, against Leone and all 
of the other members of the Council, principally on account of 
the events of March 20, 2007.  In his amended complaint Galena 
charged that Leone violated his First Amendment rights to speak 
at a public meeting and to petition the government for redress of 
his grievances.  Galena also accused Leone of attempting to 
intimidate him by sending the warning letter to which we have 
referred.  Finally, Galena alleged that the Council‟s procedure at 
a February 19, 2008 Council meeting, almost one year after the 
March 20, 2007 meeting, violated the Administrative Code and 
the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act, 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 701 et 
seq. (West 2000).  Galena predicated the first three counts of his 
amended complaint on federal law and the last count on state 
law.   
On June 12, 2008, the District Court, acting on Galena‟s 
motion, dismissed all the defendants from the case with 
prejudice except for Leone.  On August 15, 2008, Galena 
abandoned his claims against Leone except for those under the 
First Amendment, and, accordingly, Galena‟s count regarding 
the February 19, 2008 meeting no longer could afford the basis 
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for a verdict or judgment in his favor.
5
  Thus, the allegations in 
the case were narrowed considerably from the pleading stage to 
the trial stage both with respect to parties and issues. 
 The parties tried the case to a jury on the First 
Amendment issues in August 2009.  Galena testified describing 
his March 20 confrontation with Leone and explaining the 
reasons for his objection on that day.  Galena interpreted the 
Administrative Code to require that Council members introduce 
proposed ordinances to the public by placing them on a Council 
meeting agenda and making them available 72 hours before their 
first reading.  Furthermore, Galena testified that the Council 
could not vote on any ordinance until at least seven days elapsed 
after the ordinance‟s first reading, unless the ordinance 
concerned an emergency.  Galena‟s research revealed that 
frequently during 2006 and 2007 the Council had not complied 
with the prescribed formal procedure for the adoption of 
ordinances as it circumvented that procedure by waiving the first 
reading of some ordinances and finally voting on them at the 
meeting at which they were introduced.  According to Galena, 
the Council followed this truncated procedure 64 times in 2006 
and either 14 or 15 times between January and March in 2007.  
Galena considered this practice to be in violation of the 
                                                 
5
 Though we are not aware of any precedential officially 
reported Pennsylvania state court decision on the point, our 
review of the Sunshine Act leads us to believe that the Act 
probably does not provide for a damages remedy for its 
violation.  We, however, do not make a determination on this 
point inasmuch as Galena has not made a claim in this case for 
damages for a Sunshine Act violation. 
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Pennsylvania Sunshine Act because the Council was depriving 
the public of its right to review the ordinances -- and thus, 
expenditures of county tax dollars -- before the Council voted on 
them.  
 Galena stated that on March 20, 2007, he chose not to 
speak during the Hearing of the Public portion of the meeting 
and, instead, later attempted to voice his objection to the 
Council‟s violation of the prescribed procedures during the New 
Business portion of the meeting because he could not predict 
prior to that time whether the Council during the New Business 
portion of the meeting would move an ordinance from first to 
second reading.  Galena nevertheless testified that, based on the 
Council‟s prior history with respect to the adoption of 
ordinances, “there was a good chance that they would move first 
readings to second readings” at the March 20 meeting.  App. at 
34.  Galena acknowledged that previously when he had 
addressed the Council during the Hearing of the Public portion 
of Council meetings, it had permitted him to speak without 
incident.  During Galena‟s testimony, his attorney played a 
video and audio recording of the March 20 incident for the jury. 
     
 Leone testified that he had served on the Council for 32 
years and had been its chairperson during approximately eight 
separate year-long tenures.  He also testified that during his 32 
years on the Council, the only time that he had had someone 
removed from a meeting was when he had Galena removed on 
March 20, 2007.  Leone stated that he personally was not 
acquainted with Galena but knew him through Galena‟s 
attendance at Council meetings.  Leone also testified that he 
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may have spoken with Galena on one occasion prior to March 
20, 2007, about a matter before the Council on which he and 
Galena were in agreement.  Leone further testified that he bore 
no personal animosity toward anyone because of that person‟s 
opinions, but he believed that the Code restricted members of 
the public to speaking only during the part of the Council 
meetings designated for public comment.  Leone stated that, 
“quite a few times” on prior occasions, he had found Galena‟s 
comments to be “on the mark,” although there were also “a few 
times that he wasn‟t.”  Id. at 73-74.    
 Leone testified that he did not recognize or understand 
the basis for Galena‟s objection at the time that Galena made it 
on March 20.  Leone stated that when he ruled Galena out of 
order he did not know what Galena would say and he would 
have removed anyone who interrupted the meeting regardless of 
the content of that person‟s speech.  Leone also testified that, 
although the Council solicitor had not briefed him about his 
obligations under the Sunshine Act, the solicitor told him that 
the Council was in compliance with the Act.  Leone stated that 
he was not aware of any Sunshine Act provision that allows any 
person to object at any time to a perceived violation of the Act. 
 The sheriff‟s deputy who had been present at the meeting 
testified that during the incident Galena was calm while Leone‟s 
demeanor was “pretty animated.”  Id. at 56.   Joseph Giles, a 
Council member who was present on March 20, testified that 
Galena‟s objections were not insulting, threatening, insolent, 
slanderous, or obscene.  Giles, however, also testified that when 
he had been chairperson of the Council, if a member of the 
audience had spoken at a time other than during the Hearing of 
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the Public portion of the meeting he would have called that 
person out of order.  Giles also testified that Galena was being 
“boisterous,” and that if a member of the public refused to “go 
through the normal process in order to record comments,” he 
would have acted as Leone did.  Id. at 62-63. 
 At the close of Galena‟s case, Leone moved to dismiss 
the amended complaint, arguing that Galena did not provide 
evidence that Leone intended to suppress Galena‟s speech based 
on Galena‟s viewpoint.  The District Court denied the motion 
but stated that it might revisit the issue later in the case.  As we 
have indicated, the jury returned a verdict finding that Leone 
violated Galena‟s First Amendment rights by having him 
removed from the Council meeting and awarding him $5,000 in 
compensatory damages.  The jury, however, did not award 
punitive damages.   
 The parties followed the verdict with their post-trial 
motions.  Leone again moved for judgment as a matter of law, 
but this time the District Court granted his motion, finding that 
Galena did not adduce legally sufficient evidence that Leone had 
suppressed Galena‟s speech because of either an animus toward 
him or a disagreement regarding his proposed message.  Galena 
filed motions for attorney‟s fees and costs, but, in light of the 
Court having granted Leone‟s motion for judgment as a matter 
of law, it denied Galena‟s motions as moot. 6  Galena filed 
                                                 
6
 Unquestionably, inasmuch as the District Court granted Leone 
judgment as a matter of law, Galena‟s motions were moot 
because the losing party in a section 1983 action is not entitled 
to attorney‟s fees and costs.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (providing 
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timely notices of appeal from the Court‟s orders.     
 
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Galena‟s First Amendment civil rights claims under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and (4) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and had 
jurisdiction over Galena‟s state law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 
1367.  We have jurisdiction on the appeal from the orders of the 
District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 We exercise plenary review of the District Court‟s grant 
of judgment as a matter of law and apply the same standard as 
the District Court: the motion “should be granted only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, there is no question of material fact for the 
jury and any verdict other than the one directed would be 
erroneous under the governing law.”  Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 
89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); see also Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 
4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that a court may grant 
a motion for judgment as a matter of law “only if, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and 
giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, 
                                                                                                             
for attorney‟s fees to the prevailing party); Luria Bros. & Co. v. 
Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1982) (losing party in a 
section 1983 case is not entitled to attorney‟s fees).  In light of 
our disposition of the case, Galena‟s motions remain moot. 
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there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably 
could find liability”).  “[A] directed verdict is mandated where 
the facts and the law will reasonably support only one 
conclusion.”  McDermott Int‟l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 
356, 111 S.Ct. 807, 818 (1991).      
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 A. Issues on Appeal   
 Galena raises two overarching issues on this appeal.  
First, he argues that he presented legally sufficient evidence to 
support the jury‟s finding underlying its verdict that Leone acted 
with intent to suppress his speech based on his viewpoint and 
identity when Leone ejected him from the Council meeting.  
Second, Galena contends that the Sunshine Act‟s public 
objection provision allowed him to speak at any time during the 
Council meeting, and has “direct implications on the First 
Amendment rights of a citizen speaker at a government 
meeting.”  Appellant‟s br. at 22.  Galena also objects to the 
District Court‟s ruling that Galena waived his Sunshine Act 
claims prior to the trial.  Id.  Galena, in making these arguments, 
challenges the Administrative Code insofar as it restricts the 
public‟s time to speak to the Hearing of the Public portion of a 
meeting.  Specifically, Galena believes that the Code does not 
allow an adequate alternative method of communication for a 
speaker who wishes to object to the Council‟s procedures at a 
time other than the Hearing of the Public portion of Council 
meetings.   
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 B. The First Amendment and Section 1983 
 For Galena to succeed in this action he had to satisfy the 
section 1983 requirement that a plaintiff show that the defendant 
acted under color of state law, and, while so acting, deprived the 
plaintiff of his rights under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.  42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 
48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55 (1988).  Of course, there is no 
doubt that Leone was acting under color of state law when, in 
his official capacity as chairperson of the Council, he ordered 
the deputy sheriff to escort Galena from the Council meeting.  
See Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 
1994) (“[A]cts of a state or local employee in her official 
capacity will generally be found to have occurred under color of 
state law.”).  Indeed, Leone does not contend otherwise.  Galena 
asserts that Leone deprived him of his First Amendment rights 
to free speech and to petition the government for redress of his 
grievances.
7
   
In our consideration of this case we recognize that, 
though the First Amendment‟s protection of freedom of 
expression is not inviolate, when a public official excludes a 
                                                 
7
  Inasmuch as, for purposes of this case, the tests under the 
speech and petition clauses of the First Amendment are the 
same, we will discuss the claims together as a single claim.  See, 
e.g., Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 281 (3d Cir. 
2004) (discussing speech and petition clause claims together).  
We note that the District Court, without objection, in submitting 
the case to the jury also combined the claims under both clauses. 
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citizen from a public meeting, the official must not be acting in 
violation of that amendment.  See Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 
436 F.3d 397, 404 (3d Cir. 2006).  Therefore, we address the 
question of whether Leone, in excluding Galena from the 
Council meeting, violated the First Amendment.    
 C. Forum Analysis 
 When a First Amendment free speech challenge arises 
from a restriction on speech on government owned or controlled 
property, as was the case here, the classification of the forum 
determines the contours of the First Amendment rights that a 
court recognizes when reviewing the challenged governmental 
action.  See United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 274 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (“The degree of First Amendment protection a 
speaker enjoys depends on the type of forum in which his 
expressive activity occurred.”); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police of 
Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3d Cir. 1992).  We are 
concerned here with three categories of public forums: (1) the 
traditional public forum; (2) the designated public forum; and 
(3) the limited public forum.
8
  
                                                 
8
There appears to be some inconsistency in federal courts‟ 
opinions, even those of the Supreme Court, as to whether a 
limited public forum is a separate category or a subset of a 
designated public forum with a third category of forums being 
“nonpublic forums”.  Compare Int‟l Soc‟y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 
2705 (1992) (“The second category of public property is the 
designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited 
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 Traditional public forums include public streets, parks, 
and other public areas traditionally devoted to assembly and 
debate.  See Ark. Educ. Television Comm‟n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 
666, 677, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 1641 (1998).  A government entity 
creates a designated public forum when it intentionally 
designates property that traditionally has not been regarded as a 
public forum for use as a public forum.  Christian Legal Soc‟y 
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 
130 S.Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010).  In both traditional public 
forums and designated public forums the government may enact 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, but 
any restrictions on the content of speech must be tailored 
narrowly to serve a compelling government interest.  See 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009).  
                                                                                                             
character-property that the State has opened for expressive 
activity by part or all of the public.”); with Christian Legal 
Soc‟y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) (listing limited 
public forum as a separate third category and not discussing 
nonpublic forums).  Recently the Court has used the term 
“limited public forum” interchangeably with “nonpublic forum,” 
thus suggesting that these categories of forums are the same. See 
Martinez, 130 S.Ct. at 2985 (citing Perry Educ. Ass‟n v. Perry 
Local Educators‟ Ass‟n, 460 U.S. 37, 49, 103 S.Ct. 948, 957 
(1983)); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 
106, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 2100 (2001).  Because the continued 
existence vel non of a “nonpublic forum” category has no 
bearing in this case, we need not dwell on the possible 
distinction between limited public forums and nonpublic 
forums. 
  21 
The First Amendment prohibits restrictions based on a speaker‟s 
viewpoint in both types of forums.  Id.   
 In contrast to traditional and designated public forums, a 
governmental entity creates a limited public forum when it 
provides for “a forum that is limited to use by certain groups or 
dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.”  Id.; 
Donovan ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 
F.3d 211, 225 (3d Cir. 2003).  In Eichenlaub v. Township of 
Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2004), we were concerned with 
restrictions on speech in a limited public forum.  There we held 
that the citizens‟ forum portion of the Indiana Township Board 
of Supervisors meeting was a limited public forum because 
“public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject 
matter . . . matters presented at a citizen‟s forum may be limited 
to issues germane to town government.”  Id. at 281 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  In limited public forums, 
to avoid infringing on First Amendment rights, the 
governmental regulation of speech only need be viewpoint-
neutral and “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the 
forum[.]”  Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 
107, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 2100 (2001) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).
9
   
                                                 
9
 We have stated that “we have generally applied to limited 
public fora the constitutional requirements applicable to 
designated public fora.”  Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of 
West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 
Christ‟s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 
148 F.3d 242, 248-55 (3d Cir. 1998)).  In light of Pleasant 
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 Here, the District Court instructed the jury that the Erie 
County Council meeting was a limited public forum.  Galena, in 
part of his brief, agrees with the limited forum designation but in 
another part he argues that the District Court‟s designation of 
the Council meeting as a limited public forum was erroneous.
10
  
But, as we discuss in the next section, Galena has waived the 
argument that the District Court‟s recognition of the Council 
meeting as a limited public forum was erroneous.  In any event, 
even if he properly had presented and preserved his argument 
with respect to the misclassification of the forum so that we 
found it necessary to address the argument on its merits, we 
would conclude that Galena‟s position would not be meritorious. 
 It is perfectly clear that the District Court was correct when it 
held that the March 20 Council meeting was a limited public 
forum inasmuch as the meeting was held for the limited purpose 
of governing Erie County and discussing topics related to that 
governance.  See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7, 103 S.Ct. at 955 n.7; 
see also Rowe v. City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800, 803 (11th Cir. 
2004) (per curiam) (“As a limited public forum, a city council 
meeting is not open for endless public commentary speech but 
instead is simply a limited platform to discuss the topic at 
                                                                                                             
Grove, this statement may no longer be good law.   
 
10Galena indicates that the District Court‟s “analysis of a 
„limited forum‟ is fatally deficient because it considered the 
Sunshine Law irrelevant to the proceeding,” but then states that 
“Galena‟s right to speak out in this „limited forum‟ on March 
20, 2007, is clear from the straight forward prose in the 
Pennsylvania Sunshine Law „objection‟ provision.”  Appellant‟s 
br. at 24, 26.  
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hand.”).   
 In a limited public forum, such as the Council meeting, 
“content-based restraints are permitted, so long as they are 
designed to confine the forum to the limited and legitimate 
purposes for which it was created.”  Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 280 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The 
government may not “regulat[e] speech when the specific 
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker 
is the rationale for the restriction.”  Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 
2516 (1995).   The government, however, may restrict the time, 
place and manner of speech, as long as those restrictions are 
reasonable and serve the purpose for which the government 
created the limited public forum.  Pleasant Grove, 129 S.Ct. at 
1132.  A time, place, and manner restriction on speech is 
reasonable if it is (1) content-neutral, (2) narrowly tailored to 
serve an important governmental interest, and (3) leaves open 
ample alternatives for communication of information.  See Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-803, 109 S.Ct. 
2746, 2753-60 (1989).  However, even if a limitation on speech 
is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, there is a 
First Amendment violation if the defendant applied the 
restriction because of the speaker‟s viewpoint.  See, e.g., 
Monteiro, 436 F.3d at 404.  Keeping these principles with 
respect to the categorization of public forums in mind, we now 
address Galena‟s arguments starting with the Sunshine Act. 
 D. The Sunshine Act  
 The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the 
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Sunshine Act to “provide citizens with an opportunity to observe 
the deliberation, policy formulation and decision-making 
processes of public agencies.”  Lee Publ‟ns, Inc. v. Dickinson 
Sch. of Law, 848 A.2d 178, 180 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) 
(citing 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 702 (West 2000)).  The 
Sunshine Act requires that: (1) “[o]fficial action and 
deliberations by a quorum of the members of an agency. . . take 
place at a meeting open to the public
11;” (2) “the vote of each 
member who actually votes on any . . . ordinance. . . must be 
publicly cast . . . ;” (3) minutes be kept of agency meetings; and 
(4) public notice be given in advance of the meeting in a manner 
directed by the Act.  65 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 704, 705, 706, 
709 (West 2000).  The “Public participation” section of the Act 
states that “[a]ny person has the right to raise an objection at any 
time to a perceived violation of [the Sunshine Act] at any 
meeting of a board or council of a political subdivision or an 
authority created by a political subdivision.” Id. § 710.1(c).   
It is a matter of some interest, inasmuch as Galena views 
the Sunshine Act as expanding First Amendment rights, that the 
Act includes a provision that “[t]he board or council has the 
option to accept all public comments at the beginning of the 
meeting.”  65 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 710.1(a).  The 
Administrative Code‟s provision for public comments during the 
Hearing of the Public at the outset of the meeting would seem to 
be in accordance with that provision as that portion of the 
                                                 
11
 Agencies include “any board, council, authority or 
commission of the Commonwealth or of any political 
subdivision of the Commonwealth . . . .” 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 703 (West 2000). 
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meeting is the first item on the Council‟s agenda following 
formal starting procedures.   
 Galena argues that section 710.1(c), which allows any 
person to raise a contention that there has been a Sunshine Act 
violation at any time, pre-empts the Administrative Code‟s 
limitation of public comments to the Hearing of the Public 
portion of Council meetings and supports his claim that he had a 
First Amendment right to object to the Council‟s decision to 
move an ordinance immediately from the first reading to the 
second reading when he attempted to raise the issue.  Moreover, 
he believes that the Council was employing a procedure in 
violation of the Sunshine Act when, in acting on an ordinance, it 
followed the truncated procedure that Galena sought to 
challenge.  Galena also argues that the Sunshine Act “offers the 
key to unlock a limited forum.”  Appellant‟s br. at 28.  He thus 
seems to believe that the Pennsylvania General Assembly can 
expand the scope of First Amendment rights beyond the limits 
on them that otherwise would exist.  Furthermore, Galena 
contends that Leone‟s purported ignorance of the Sunshine Act 
did not give him an excuse to justify his suppression of Galena‟s 
First Amendment rights.   
 The District Court held that Galena waived the foregoing 
Sunshine Act arguments because he did not ask the Court to 
submit his contentions to the jury and did not object to the 
Court‟s omission of them during its instructions to the jury.  The 
Court pointed out that even though the amended complaint 
contained a count asserting that the Council had committed a 
Sunshine Act violation, though on a date other than March 20, 
2007, Galena voluntarily moved to dismiss that count before the 
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Court sent the case to the jury and the Court did as Galena 
asked.
12
  Moreover, the Court reasoned that, even if the 
Sunshine Act claims had been presented properly, they would 
not have been legally relevant to Galena‟s First Amendment 
claim.   
 Clearly, the District Court was correct both procedurally 
and substantively with respect to the Sunshine Act issues.  When 
Galena voluntarily waived his Sunshine Act claim prior to trial, 
even laying aside the fact that the claim as pleaded did not relate 
to the March 20, 2007 events, he removed the issue of the 
Council‟s violation of the Act, at least as a basis for the return of 
a verdict in his favor, from the jury‟s consideration.  Moreover, 
as Leone correctly points out, the jury instructions did not 
instruct the jury with respect to either the contents of the 
Sunshine Act or any legal interpretation of the Act.  In fact, at 
the outset of its charge the Court told the jury that “[i]t is not 
your function in this case to determine whether there was or was 
not a violation of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law and/or any 
provision of the Erie County Administrative Code.  In other 
words, those issues are irrelevant and should play no part in your 
deliberation in this case.”  Addendum to app. at 2.  Galena does 
not claim in his brief that he objected to the charge, and we see 
no indication in the record that he lodged such objection, and 
thus the possible effect of a violation of the Sunshine Act was 
taken out of this case.  
                                                 
12
 As we have indicated, the Sunshine Act claim related to an 
action the Council took at a meeting on February 19, 2008.  
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 In any event, even though Leone‟s enforcement of the 
Code in restricting Galena‟s speech could have raised a question 
of the validity of the Code under the Sunshine Act, any question 
of whether the Code, as written or applied, was inconsistent with 
the Act would have been separate from the question of whether 
the Code‟s provisions unreasonably restricted the First 
Amendment rights of a member of the public who wanted to 
speak at a time other than the Hearing of the Public portion of a 
meeting.  Thus, even if we held that Leone violated the Sunshine 
Act when he had Galena removed from the meeting, our result 
would be no different on this appeal in this First Amendment 
case.  Moreover, Galena does not assert in his brief that in the 
District Court he argued that the Code did not comply with the 
Sunshine Act and thus the District Court did not determine 
whether the Code complied with the Act.  Therefore, because 
Galena does not now argue that he is entitled to a reinstatement 
of the verdict on the discrete basis that there was a Sunshine Act 
violation, did not argue in the District Court that the Code did 
not comply with the Sunshine Act, and did not object when the 
Court instructed the jury not to determine if there had been a 
violation of the Sunshine Act, we will not address the question 
of whether the Code, as written or applied, is valid under the 
Sunshine Act. 
 Galena also argues that the District Court erred because it 
did not factor into its forum analysis the Sunshine Act‟s 
provision allowing objections to be made at any time during a 
meeting subject to the provisions of the Act, such as the March 
20 meeting.  In Galena‟s words in his brief, the Sunshine Act 
“unlock[ed] a limited forum.”  Appellant‟s br. at 28.  As we 
discussed above, the government‟s intent in creating the forum, 
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as well as the extent of the permissible use by the public within 
the forum, determines the designation of the type of forum.  See 
Brody by and Through Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1117 
(3d Cir. 1992).  Consequently, a state law could be relevant 
when a determination of the designation of a forum is made if 
the law opened a meeting to a wider range of public expression 
than normally is allowed in a limited public forum.  Galena, 
however, did not advance this theory on how the Sunshine Act 
could have influenced the forum analysis in his proposed jury 
instructions.  Furthermore, we do not find anything in the record 
supporting a conclusion that Galena objected to the District 
Court‟s jury instructions when the Court, in instructing the jury, 
treated the Council meeting as a limited public forum.  
Therefore, Galena has waived his argument that the Court erred 
in not factoring in the Sunshine Act into its forum analysis.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1) (a party waives its objection to jury 
instructions unless it objects “stating distinctly the matter 
objected to and the grounds of the objection”); Thabault v. 
Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 525 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 51).    
 In sum, Galena‟s Sunshine Act arguments were not 
presented to the jury in the District Court‟s instructions, and, 
inasmuch as Galena did not request the Court to present them in 
the instructions and did not object to their not having been 
presented, he has not preserved any argument with respect to the 
Court not presenting them to the jury so as to justify our 
consideration of his Sunshine Act arguments on this appeal.
13
  
                                                 
13
 We are aware that the general rule that a court of appeals does 
not consider an issue that was not raised in the district court may 
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Further, as the Court noted, the possible questions of whether 
Galena had a right to speak under the Sunshine Act and whether 
Leone violated the Act by ejecting him from the Council 
meeting are distinct from the issues in this First Amendment 
case and the Court told the jury not to consider possible 
Sunshine Act violations in its deliberations.  Moreover, though 
Leone‟s actions may have violated the Sunshine Act, such a 
violation would not per se infringe on Galena‟s First 
Amendment rights because a statute can create free speech 
rights under state law beyond those that the First Amendment 
recognizes.
14
   
Accordingly, the questions we address on the merits on 
this appeal, when taking into account well-established practices 
concerning the procedures for advancing and preserving 
contentions, are whether Galena‟s viewpoint or identity 
motivated Leone when he had Galena removed from the 
meeting or whether, in his role as chairperson of the Council, he 
was enforcing a reasonable time, manner, and place restriction 
in a limited public forum.  In fact, the Court instructed the jury 
to decide these issues.    
                                                                                                             
be relaxed if “the public interest or justice so warrants,” 
Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm‟n v. 
Pena, 126 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 1997), but we see no reason to 
relax the rule here. 
 
14
Of course, we realize that an official action in some 
circumstances could violate both the First Amendment and the 
Sunshine Act.  
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 E. Validity of Time, Place, and Manner Restriction 
 Our recognition of the limited role of the Sunshine Act 
on this appeal takes us to our next inquiry which focuses on 
Galena‟s argument under the First Amendment concerning the 
validity of the Administrative Code‟s restriction on public 
participation.  In particular, we consider whether the Code left 
Galena with alternative means of communicating the content of 
his objection to the Council‟s procedures.15  According to 
Galena, he could not have objected during the Hearing of the 
Public portion of the Council meeting to the Council‟s 
procedures in adopting an ordinance as that portion of the 
meeting preceded the New Business portion of the meeting 
when the Council considers the adoption of ordinances.  
Therefore, Galena contends that the restriction on public 
participation did not provide him with an adequate alternative 
means of communicating his message concerning the Council‟s 
procedure in adopting the ordinance.   
 Leone responds, and the District Court held, that Galena 
waived this argument as well as his Sunshine Act arguments, 
inasmuch as the question of whether a regulation leaves open 
alternative means of communication is a question of fact that, 
                                                 
15
 As we stated earlier, there are two other considerations in 
determining whether a restriction is reasonable: (1) whether the 
restriction is content neutral, and (2) whether it is narrowly 
tailored to serve an important governmental interest.  See Ward, 
491 U.S. at 791-803, 109 S.Ct. at 2753-60.  Inasmuch as Galena 
did not properly raise these issues in the District Court, nor does 
he raise them on appeal, we will not discuss these two factors. 
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without objection by Galena, the Court never presented to the 
jury for its consideration.  Leone further argues that even if 
Galena had not waived the issue, Galena‟s right to voice his 
objection during a subsequent Council meeting provided him 
with an adequate alternative means to communicate his 
message.   
 Clearly, the District Court‟s ruling was correct on this 
waiver issue.  The reasonableness of a time, place or manner 
restriction on speech presents a question of law but the 
determination involves three subsidiary elements: the challenged 
restriction must be (1) content-neutral, (2) narrowly tailored to 
serve an important governmental interest, and (3) leave open 
ample alternatives for communication of information.  See 
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791-803, 109 S.Ct. at 2753-60.  The three 
subsidiary elements of the reasonableness question pursuant to 
which a court determines the validity of the restriction are 
questions of fact which should be submitted to the jury, except 
where the evidence applicable to a particular element entitles a 
party to judgment as a matter of law on that element.  See 
McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 But the only factual question that the District Court told 
the jury that it had to resolve in determining whether Leone 
violated Galena‟s First Amendment rights in having him ejected 
from the March 20 meeting was whether Leone intended to 
restrict Galena‟s speech because of its content or his identity, or 
whether he intended to enforce a reasonable restriction on the 
time, place, and manner of that speech.
16
  The jury instructions 
                                                 
16
 The District Court charged the jury to answer the following 
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assumed that the restriction, as the Code is applied, on when a 
member of the public may speak at a meeting was reasonable, 
and Galena does not point to any place in the record showing 
that he requested that the Court give an instruction on adequate 
alternative means of communication or at which he objected to 
the lack of such an instruction in its charge.  In fact, even on this 
appeal, Galena does not contend that the jury instructions were 
flawed or incomplete.
17
  To the contrary, he argues that the jury 
verdict returned on the instructions should be upheld.  We thus 
are constrained to treat the Court‟s charge to the jury as having 
correctly set forth the law.  Furthermore, even aside from the 
fact that Galena did not object to how the Court submitted the 
case to the jury, he did not move for the Court to hold that the 
restriction on his speech was not reasonable as a matter of law, 
though he does contend on this appeal that, as a legal matter, 
there was not an adequate alternative means of communicating 
his message.     
                                                                                                             
questions:  (1) whether “in ruling [Galena] out of order and 
ordering his removal from the March 20, 2007 meeting of 
County Council, [Leone] acted with the intention of imposing 
reasonable restrictions on the time, place and manner of 
[Galena‟s] speech to preserve order and decorum at the 
meeting,” or (2)  whether “[Leone] acted with the intention of 
suppressing [Galena‟s] speech based on its message or based on 
the identity of the speaker.”  Addendum to app. at 9-10. 
 
17
 In this opinion we make numerous references to the District 
Court‟s charge to the jury and observe that in his brief Galena 
does not claim to have objected to the charge in any respect.  
Indeed, Galena never mentions the Court‟s charge in his brief. 
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 Although we have focused to a large extent on procedural 
issues, as it is appropriate to do, we nevertheless hold that, as a 
substantive matter, it is clear from the record that there were 
adequate alternative means for Galena to communicate his 
objection to the Council‟s procedure in adopting ordinances.  
The Supreme Court has required that an alternative means of 
communication provide only a “reasonable opportunity” for 
communication of the speaker‟s message.  See City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54, 106 S.Ct. 925, 932 
(1986); see also Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1138 
(9th
 Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court generally will not strike 
down a governmental action for failure to leave open ample 
alternative channels of communication unless the government 
enactment will foreclose an entire medium of public expression 
across the landscape of particular community or setting.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).   
 Galena argues that he would have needed a “crystal ball” 
to predict during the Hearing of the Public portion of the March 
20 meeting what actions the Council would take following that 
portion of the meeting.  Appellant‟s br. at 16.  Thus, he contends 
that he could not be expected to object to something that he did 
not know would happen.  At the March 20 meeting, however, 
another member of the public challenged the Council‟s 
procedure of moving ordinances from the first reading to the 
second reading, a process he described as “bumping first 
readings to second readings.”  App. at 141.  Moreover, as the 
District Court pointed out, Galena had been tracking the number 
of times the Council moved an ordinance from the first reading 
to the second reading and found that in the 15 months prior to 
the March 20 meeting, the Council employed this procedure 
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approximately 80 times.  Thus, Galena did not need to be a 
fortune teller to recognize that the Council might employ this 
procedure at the March 20 meeting and to object to the 
procedure before it happened.  Furthermore, if Galena wanted to 
object to the procedure as it related to the specific ordinance 
being considered on March 20, 2007, he could have done so at 




 We recognize that Galena may deem that the alternative 
opportunities allowing him to object to the Council‟s procedures 
before or after the New Business portion of the March 20 
meeting were inadequate inasmuch as he may believe that an 
objection made at the time the Council is considering a proposed 
ordinance is the best time to object to an irregularity in the 
Council‟s procedure in considering the adoption of that 
ordinance for the objection might lead the Council to change its 
procedure with respect to that ordinance.  Though we 
acknowledge that such a view would not be unreasonable, the 
First Amendment does not guarantee a speaker the most 
effective means of communication of the his message.  Heffron 
v. Int‟l Soc‟y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 
                                                 
18
We also point out that when the Council took up the adoption 
of an ordinance on March 20, it was considering the type of 
business that often came before it in the regular course of its 
proceedings.  Thus, this case does not involve a situation in 
which in the New Business portion of the meeting the Council 
undertook to deal with a matter completely different from its 
usual business, though we do not suggest that if it had done so 
our result on this appeal would have been different. 
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647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2564 (1981) (“[T]he First Amendment 
does not guarantee the right to communicate one‟s views at all 
times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”); 
McTernan, 564 F.3d at 657 (“[T]he First Amendment does not 
guarantee a speaker an absolute right to actual conversation with 
his audience in every circumstance.”).   
 Here, as we have indicated, Galena could have delivered 
his message to his intended audience at the Hearing of the 
Public portion of the March 20 meeting or, if he wished to 
address a specific action the Council took after the Hearing of 
the Public portion of the March 20 meeting, he could have 
conveyed his objection during the Hearing of the Public portion 
of the next Council meeting, or, indeed, during any future 
Council meeting.  Thus, the Hearing of the Public portion of the 
Council‟s meetings provided Galena with a reasonable 
opportunity to communicate his message to his intended 
audience while respecting the Council‟s interest in its meetings 
being efficient and orderly.  Therefore, even if Galena properly 
had raised in the District Court the issue of the adequacy of the 
alternative means for him to communicate his objection, we 
would find, as a matter of law, that the Administrative Code‟s 
restriction of public comments to the Hearing of the Public 
portion of the Council‟s meetings did not deprive Galena of 
adequate alternative opportunities to convey his views.    
 F. Intent to Suppress Speech Based on Viewpoint or  
                      Identity  
 The District Court determined that Galena did not submit 
sufficient evidence to show that Leone acted with intent to 
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suppress his speech based on Galena‟s identity or disagreement 
with Galena‟s message and the challenge to this determination 
gives rise to an overarching issue on the appeal.  Galena points 
to the following evidence which he believes contradicts the 
Court‟s holding: Galena testified that he frequently attended 
Council meetings and had been critical of its expenditure of tax 
dollars; on prior occasions, Leone scowled, grimaced, grinned or 
laughed at his comments during the Hearing of the Public 
portion of meetings but did not do so when other speakers made 
comments; and the deputy sheriff present at the March 20 
meeting, described Galena‟s demeanor during the confrontation 
with Leone as calm, and Leone‟s demeanor as “animated.” App. 
at 55-56.  The videotape of the incident corroborates the deputy 
sheriff‟s account of the incident.    
 The District Court, however, viewed the evidence in light 
of other evidence introduced at the trial that was uncontroverted: 
 namely Leone‟s testimony that he served on the Council for 32 
years and was involved in drafting the Administrative Code; he 
understood that the Code allowed public participation only 
during the Hearing of the Public portion of meetings and was 
unaware of a Sunshine Act provision allowing the public to 
object at meetings;
19 Galena‟s testimony that he spoke at 14 or 
                                                 
19
 We do not suggest that Leone‟s ignorance of the provisions of 
the Sunshine Act in any way enhances his position on this 
appeal for if Leone violated the Act his ignorance of its content 
would not excuse his action.  But on this appeal it does not 
matter whether Leone violated the Act because, for the reasons 
we already have set forth, evidence of the violation would not 
strengthen Galena‟s position under the First Amendment as a 
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15 Council meetings before March 20, 2007, and on every 
occasion except for one, he spoke during the Hearing of the 
Public portion of the meeting; according to a transcript admitted 
into evidence and Leone‟s testimony, Galena spoke during the 
business portion of a January 2, 2007 Council meeting and 
Leone pounded his gavel and stated “You keep that up, I‟m 
going to have you taken out.  You had your chance to speak.”  
Id. at 111-12, 157; Leone testified that the March 20 incident 
was the first occasion in his 32 years on the Council that he had 
a member of the public removed from a meeting; and finally, 
other members of the public including Galena, frequently spoke 
out against the Council and one member of the public addressed 
the Council‟s procedure of moving an ordinance from the first 
reading to the second reading during the Hearing of the Public 
portion of the March 20 meeting without interruption from 
Leone or other Council members. 
 In reviewing this evidence we, like the District Court, 
must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party” and we “may not make credibility determinations or 
weigh the evidence.”  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000).  Thus, 
where a finding of a constitutional violation must be predicated 
on a determination that the defendant in suppressing speech 
acted with an improper intent and the jury returns a verdict for 
the plaintiff, “judgment as a matter of law will be granted to the 
defendant only if that verdict is not based on sufficient 
                                                                                                             
violation of the Act is not a per se violation of the First 
Amendment and the Act does not expand the First Amendment 
rights of members of the public. 
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evidence.”  Monteiro, 436 F.3d at 406.  But a scintilla of 
evidence supporting a conclusion that Leone had an improper 
motivation when having Galena removed is not sufficient.  
Rather, there must be enough “evidence upon which the jury 
could properly find a verdict” for Galena for his case to survive 
Leone‟s motion for judgment as a matter of law.  Lightning 




 The most telling evidence that refutes any reasonable 
inference that there was viewpoint discrimination is the manner 
in which the March 20 confrontation unfolded.  Indeed, that 
evidence conclusively establishes that this case simply cannot be 
sustained as a First Amendment case based on the restriction of 
Galena‟s attempt to state his viewpoint that the Council was 
violating the Sunshine Act
21
 in adopting the ordinance on March 
20.  At the March 20 meeting, when the Council considered the 
ordinance, Galena stated that “I have an objection” after which 
Leone banged his gavel.  App. at 7.  Galena then again stated 
that “[I have] an objection” and Leone called Galena out of 
order.  Id.  Galena, undeterred, then stated “You are in violation 
                                                 
20
 Of course, our reference to Galena‟s evidence does not signal 
that we are weighing that evidence against Leone‟s evidence.  
To the contrary, we are describing Galena‟s evidence because it 
is necessary to do so in determining whether the evidence 
adequately supported the verdict. 
 
21
 We realize that Galena also said that Council was violating 
the Administrative Code but that allegation adds nothing to this 
discussion. 
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. . .” at which point, before Galena could finish his sentence, 
Leone interrupted and stated that if Galena kept it up he would 
have him taken out.  Id.  Galena objected a third time, and 
finally stated that the reason for his objection was that there was 
a violation of the Sunshine Act.  It was then that Leone ordered 
the deputy sheriff to remove Galena.  Galena did not state that 
the Council was violating the Sunshine Act until after Leone 
warned him twice that he was out of order and warned him that 
further objections would result in his ejection from the meeting. 
 Id.    
In light of these facts, it is impossible to conclude that 
hostility to Galena‟s viewpoint motivated Leone when he 
declared Galena out of order and attempted to silence him 
because Leone took these actions before he knew the basis for 
Galena‟s objection.  Indeed, as we explained above, Galena in 
his brief acknowledges this point.  In fact, Galena relies to a 
degree on Leone‟s ignorance of the basis for his objection as he 
believes that it was wrong for Leone to act before he knew that 
basis. 
 We recognize, of course, that when Leone ejected Galena 
from the meeting he knew why Galena was objecting.  But that 
knowledge does not affect our analysis for Leone said to Galena 
that “if you keep it up I‟ll have you taken out” before Galena 
mentioned the Sunshine Act.  Id. at 148.  The record here 
precludes a finding that Leone had Galena removed because 
Galena contended that there was a Sunshine Act violation. 
We also note that Leone stated that he did not know or 
understand the basis for Galena‟s objections when he declared 
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Galena out of order and that he would have him taken out of the 
meeting without such knowledge.
22
  Indeed, Galena 
acknowledged that Leone declared him out of order before he 
specified the basis for his objection and the minutes of the 
March 20 meeting confirm that this was so.  Thus, this case 
cannot be understood as involving a situation in which Leone 
reacted to Galena‟s comments because Galena complained to the 
Council that there was a Sunshine Act violation.      
 Overall, it is beyond doubt that Leone restricted Galena‟s 
speech because Leone was enforcing the Administrative Code 
and not because of Galena‟s reason for objecting.  Indeed, 
Galena essentially acknowledges this point in his brief in which 
he sets forth that he “testified that he did not express the 
contents of „my objection‟ because Mr. Leone refused to 
recognize the objection.”  Appellant‟s br. at 5.   
 We also point out that even if there had been evidence 
that could support a finding that Leone knew the basis for 
Galena‟s objection when Leone ruled him out of order, our 
result would be the same.  The Administrative Code is applied 
to limit all comments of the public to the Hearing of the Public 
portion of a meeting regardless of whether the proposed 
comment relates directly to a matter that the Council then is 
addressing.  Thus, the restriction on making comments is 
divorced entirely from the contents of the comments and 
therefore the chairperson‟s determination to enforce the 
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 Of course, by the time that the deputy sheriff took Galena out 
of the meeting, he had stated the basis for his objection. 
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restriction does not take into account the viewpoint that the 
speaker intends to set forth.  Accordingly, we would reach the 
same result on this appeal even if Galena had initiated his 
comments on March 20 by stating that “The Sunshine Act is 
being violated.”  Though Leone might have been violating the 
Sunshine Act if he had Galena ejected for persisting in his 
comments, Leone would not have been violating the First 
Amendment as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because 
Leone‟s actions would not have been taken to enforce a 
viewpoint restriction and Galena still would have had an 
adequate alternative means of communication to express his 
views. 
 Notwithstanding the irrefutable record of the March 20 
meeting, in an attempt to demonstrate that Leone harbored 
animus toward his message, Galena points to Leone‟s reactions 
to his comments during the Hearing of the Public portions of 
previous Council meetings.  Specifically, Galena testified that 
on prior occasions when he spoke to the Council, Leone 
scowled, grimaced, grinned, and “almost laugh[ed]” but Leone 
did not have similar reactions when other persons spoke.  App. 
at  26-27.   
Galena argues that the jury could have attributed an 
improper motive to Leone because of his visible annoyance 
when Galena called the Council members “tax spenders.”  
Appellant‟s br. at 27-28.  Galena also argues that Leone 
channeled his frustrations with public comments at him and 
suppressed his speech because Leone did not appreciate having 
“his authority questioned.”  Id. at 19-20.  According to Galena, 
Leone‟s comments on March 20 to the members of the public 
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who had spoken during the Hearing of the Public, telling them 
to “be careful” and that the Council is “tired of some of these 
issues being brought up,” demonstrate that Leone was annoyed 
by public comments at Council meetings.  Id. at 12.  Galena 
further argues that the sheriff‟s report of the March 20 meeting 
and the video of the confrontation between him and Leone show 
that Leone was speaking in an elevated voice while Galena 
remained calm during the incident.  Galena maintains that the 
jury, from observing the demeanors of both Leone and Galena 
on videotape, reasonably could have concluded that Galena‟s 
identity motivated Leone to have him removed from the 
meeting.  Id. at 21.   
 Like the District Court, we view Leone‟s behavior toward 
Galena in light of other evidence presented at the trial that was 
uncontroverted and unimpeached.  See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, 
120 S.Ct. at 2110 (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, “the court should 
give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as 
that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted 
and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes 
from disinterested witnesses”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  But even giving Galena the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences, the evidence is insufficient to justify a 
finding that it was animus toward Galena or his message that 
motivated Leone when he had Galena removed from the 
meeting.   
 According to his testimony, Galena spoke 14 or 15 times 
during the Hearing of the Public portions of previous Council 
meetings, sometimes critically of the Council‟s actions, without 
interruption from Leone or any other member of the Council.  In 
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addition, the minutes of the March 20 Council meeting as well 
as the minutes of a January 2, 2007 meeting of the Council show 
that members of the public, during the Hearing of the Public 
portion of Council meetings, criticized the Council without any 
interruption from Leone or any of the other Council members.  
Specifically, several individuals asserted that the Council was 
breaking the law, as Galena did when he mentioned the 
Sunshine Act when he objected on March 20.  Indeed, as we 
already have emphasized, one member of the public objected 
without any adverse repercussions to the Council‟s procedure of 
moving ordinances from the first reading to the second reading, 
the same issue that Galena sought to raise on March 20, 2007.  
 Despite a history of Galena and other members of the 
public speaking out and criticizing the Council, there is no 
evidence that Leone or any other Council member attempted to 
silence members of the public who were critical of the Council.  
Although Leone chastised certain individuals at the March 20 
meeting for what he considered their baseless accusations of 
unlawful activity on the part of the Council, he did not rule them 
out of order, prevent them from speaking, or have them ejected 
from the meeting.  In fact, as we discussed above, the other 
members of the public who spoke at the Hearing of the Public 
portion of the March 20 meeting criticized the Council more 
harshly than Galena and addressed the same subject that Galena 
sought to address in his subsequent objection without being 
removed or having their speech suppressed.
23
  Further, as the 
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 Indeed, it is questionable whether Galena‟s objection to the 
procedure being followed may be characterized as a criticism of 
Leone or the Council.  Certainly courts do not regard objections 
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District Court noted, there was no evidence that Leone 
discriminated among members of the public in terms of how he 
enforced the Administrative Code.   
 Ultimately, Galena‟s arguments, rather than showing that 
Leone was biased against him or his viewpoint, starkly 
demonstrate that the only difference between Galena and the 
other members of the public who spoke out on March 20 was 
the timing of their comments.  Leone‟s reactions to Galena‟s 
comments during the Hearing of the Public portions of past 
Council meetings certainly can lead to the reasonable inference 
that, at least on some occasions, Leone disagreed with Galena‟s 
viewpoints.  However, Leone ruled Galena out of order and had 
him ejected from the meetings only when Galena spoke at a time 
other than the Hearing of the Public portion of a Council 
meeting.  On the 14 or 15 other occasions when Galena voiced 
his opinion, Leone, while sometimes disagreeing, did not 
prevent Galena from delivering his message.  Likewise, Leone‟s 
comments to the members of the public in response to their 
comments show that while he disagreed with their viewpoints, 
he did not attempt to silence their speech during the time set 
aside for public comments.
24
   
                                                                                                             
to their rulings as criticisms of them personally. 
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 The only Council minutes in the record other than those of the 
March 20 meeting, those from the January 2, 2007 meeting, 
show Leone making comments similar to those he made on 
March 20 expressing disappointment with the tenor of public 
comments.  Apparently this back and forth is a regular scenario 
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 To the extent that this case involves restrictions 
predicated on the timing of comments, the issue in this case is 
remarkably similar to the issue that the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit considered in Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control 
Bd., 67 F.3d 266 (9th Cir. 1995).  The plaintiff in Kindt, Albert 
Kindt, was a frequent participant in meetings of the Santa 
Monica Rent Control Board.  Id. at 267.  At one time Board 
regulations provided that members of the public who wished to 
address the Board fill out slips of paper, or “chits,” 
corresponding to the agenda item they sought to address.  Id.   
But because the public comments had become disruptive, the 
Board switched to a system in which it allowed public 
comments only during the last item of the agenda, Item 13.  Id. 
at 268.  Kindt, however, continued to speak and loudly disrupt 
Board meetings during portions of the meeting no longer open 
to public comments and, on several occasions, the Board 
removed him for disrupting the meeting.  Id. at 268-69.  Kindt 
filed a civil rights action alleging that the Board conspired to 
violate his First Amendment right to free speech by ejecting him 
from public Board meetings and by discriminating between 
speakers who supported their views and speakers who opposed 
them.  The District Court granted the Board summary judgment 
and, following Kindt‟s appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.   
Inasmuch as Kindt involves legal principles with respect 
to the timing of comments similar to those implicated here, 
                                                                                                             
at Council meetings: certain members of the public express 
disappointment with the Council and Leone expresses his 
disagreement with their comments.   
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though Kindt‟s conduct was more egregious than Galena‟s, we 
will quote the Court of Appeal‟s reasoning at length:          
[Kindt] argues that because Item 13 
matters occur at the end of the 
meeting, he is „deprived of speech‟ 
because he has a smaller audience 
by the time he is allowed to speak 
and because he is not allowed more 
than three minutes to respond to 
longer presentations by speakers 
who addressed the Board under 
Item 4. Those facts do not establish 
that Kindt‟s First Amendment 
rights were violated. The Board 
regulations restricting public 
commentary to three minutes per 
item at the end of each meeting are 
the kind of reasonable time, place, 
and manner restrictions that 
preserve a board‟s legitimate 
interest in conducting efficient, 
orderly meetings. . . .  No invidious 
regulation of Kindt‟s speech was 
implicated and content was not a 
factor -- e.g., the fact that the 
Board‟s views on the Cambodian 
regime might or might not be 
different from Kindt‟s was not the 
point at all. Whether he wanted to 
speak in favor of those views or 
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against them, his chit had to be 
heard under Item 13, which was the 
time set aside for public comment 
on all but such special matters as 
public hearings (Item 7). In other 
words, if the type of tangential 
resolution in issue here was meant 
to be covered by Rule 1024, the 
vice is not that the Board failed to 
hear public comment during the 
part of the agenda given over to 
„announcements, commendations, 
award of service pins, introduction 
of special guests,‟ Item 4, or the 
„salute to the flag,‟ Item 1.  The 
vice is that the Board passed 
resolutions before it heard from the 
general public.  That is not a 
violation of the First Amendment. 
 Again, Kindt was not kept 
from speaking because of the 
content of his speech, but because 
he submitted chits for items that 
were not held open for public 
commentary until Item 13 on the 
agenda. When the Board heard 
comments during Item 13, Kindt 
was never denied an opportunity to 
speak about any subject he wished. 
In fact, several times he addressed 
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personally derogatory remarks to 
individual Board members and was 
not silenced. Nor was he silenced 
before his time expired. In general, 
when Kindt was actually ejected 
from the Board meetings he was 
disrupting the proceedings by 
yelling and trying to speak when it 
was not time for an Item 13 matter. 
The only exception was when the 
ejection did not come until 
sometime after he and his cohort 
had disrupted a meeting, and the 
Board had taken a break to let 
things settle down. It appears that 
as soon as the Board returned, 
Kindt‟s cohort was seen to make an 
obscene gesture toward a Board 
member, which threatened to start 
the disruption all over again. Those 
were permissible removals within 
the Board's regulation 1017 
governing rules of decorum at 
Board meetings.  
 
Id. at 271 -272 (citations omitted) (first two emphases added and 
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last emphasis in original).
25
 
 It is significant that the minutes of the meeting of January 
2, 2007, when Galena spoke during the nonpublic comment 
period, show that Leone merely called him out of order.  So far 
as minutes in the record reveal, no member of the public other 
than Galena ever spoke out of the order for public comments set 
forth in the Administrative Code.
26
  But on the occasion of 
which we are aware when that happened, Leone was consistent 
in his application of the Code‟s temporal restriction on public 
comments.  The only reasonable inference from this evidence is 
that Leone prevented Galena from making comments regardless 
of their content at a time that the Code‟s time, place, and manner 
provisions restricted public comments.  This case simply does 
not involve suppression of speech based on the speaker‟s 
viewpoints or identity and we will not repackage it so that it 
becomes such a case. 
 The video and the sheriff‟s report shows that Leone was 
upset and Galena was calm during the confrontation but nothing 
more.  Of course, we realize that in his brief Galena recites that 
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 Though we reiterate that Galena‟s conduct surely was more 
benign than Kindt‟s, that difference does not make the principles 
of law that Kindt set forth with respect to a member of the 
public speaking at a time not designated for that purpose any 
less applicable here. 
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 We, of course, recognize that it is entirely possible that at 
meetings for which we do not have the minutes members of the 
public spoke out of order. 
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the audio and video recordings of the March 20 meeting show 
that, as Galena “was escorted out,” Leone asked if “[a]nyone 
else want[s] to go?”  Appellant‟s br. at 21.  But that comment, 
though certainly impolitic, only shows Leone‟s intent to prevent 
other members of the public from interrupting the Council 
meeting in a similar manner at a time not provided for public 
comments.  Without supporting evidence, and there is none here, 
the drawing of an inference that Leone harbored an animus 
toward Galena because of his identity or the drawing of an 
inference that the content of Galena‟s speech motivated Leone 
to have him removed from the meeting “is not a reasonable 
inference from the evidence but instead is a leap of faith.”  
Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 
95 (3d Cir. 2000).
27
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 We note that Judge Sloviter, in her dissent, compares the facts 
of this case to the facts in Monteiro.  We do not discuss that case 
at length as the circumstances in that case were so different than 
the facts here and the jury‟s finding of the defendant‟s 
unconstitutional motive was unquestionably supported by a 
legally sufficient evidentiary basis.  Monteiro involved a dispute 
between two council members over the City of Elizabeth‟s 
annual budget.  436 F.3d at 400-01.  The president of the 
council, Perkins-Auguste, ejected Monteiro, another member of 
the council, from a council meeting after Monteiro interrupted 
Perkins-Auguste to defend himself from an ad hominem attack 
Perkins-Auguste made on him.  Id. at 405.  We found that 
“[w]hile Monteiro was arguably disrupting the proceedings by 
interrupting her, he was also defending himself from a personal 
attack.  It was Perkins-Auguste who changed the tone of the 
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Galena further argues that the state lawfully could impose 
a restriction based on the content of his speech only if the 
speech would cause public unrest.  See Terminiello v. City of 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 896 (1949) (“[F]reedom of 
speech, though not absolute, . . . is nevertheless protected 
against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to 
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil 
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or 
unrest.”).  Galena reasons that inasmuch as his comments did 
not create public unrest, Leone must have suppressed his speech 
based on its content.  The District Court thought that this line of 
reasoning was flawed logically inasmuch as it begs the question 
of whether, in giving effect to an otherwise legitimate time, 
place, and manner regulation, Leone acted with the subjective 
intent of suppressing speech.   
 Clearly, the Court reached the correct conclusion with 
respect to the Terminiello issue.  To start with, as we have 
                                                                                                             
meeting from a debate about the merits of the budget to a quasi-
prosecutorial forum. . . .”  Id.  Thus, the circumstances of that 
case, which involved a debate between two council members, 
were different from the circumstances here, where a member of 
the public interrupted a council meeting at a time that was not 
set aside for public comments.  Further, unlike in Monteiro, 
where the jury plausibly could infer that Perkins-Auguste had an 
unconstitutional reason for removing Monteiro predicated on 
their confrontation over the budget, as we have explained there 
is no basis to infer that Leone had an unconstitutional motive in 
removing Galena as he did not know the content of Galena‟s 
objection when he ruled him out of order. 
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emphasized, the restriction on speech was based on its timing, 
not its content.  Furthermore, the enforcement, no matter how 
justified, of any restriction on speech, necessarily suppresses 
speech at the time it is enforced.  Thus, if a member of the 
public at the Hearing of the Public portion of a Council meeting 
wanted to discuss his child‟s birthday party, the proposed 
speech, though not presenting a danger to anyone, would be so 
far removed from the business of the meeting, or the Council‟s 
or County‟s business in general, that the chairperson could 
suppress the speech without raising First Amendment issues.  
See Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 281.   
 Finally, Galena‟s contention that he was not creating a 
disturbance, at least as that term is ordinarily understood, by 
objecting to the Council‟s procedures, even if factually accurate, 
does not change our result.  If even only one member of the 
public objects during a time when public comments are not 
allowed the Council‟s procedure in conducting business is 
affected even if the member of the public interrupts the meeting 
in a conversational, nonthreatening tone of voice.  The 
interruption of the order of business is itself the disturbance.
28
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 Thus, this case is distinguishable from Norse v. City of Santa 
Cruz, 629 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), where a 
governmental entity removed a member of the public from a 
public meeting for disagreeing without disrupting the meeting.  
In Norse, the Santa Cruz City Council ejected a member of the 
public from a Council meeting after he gave the Council a silent 
Nazi salute.  Id. at 970.  The Court rejected the City‟s argument 
that the City could remove those members of the public who 
made silent, non-disruptive gestures because members of the 
  53 
See e.g., Kindt, 67 F.3d at 271 (upholding the ejection of a 
spectator from a public meeting because he was “disrupting the 
proceedings by yelling and trying to speak when it was not time 
for” public comments). 
 It is, of course, appropriate for us to consider how 
exempting all members of the public, and not just Galena, from 
the protocol confining comments to the Public Hearing portion 
of meetings would affect the functioning of the County Council. 
 See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654, 101 S.Ct. at 2567 (holding that 
state supreme court erred by failing to consider how granting all 
groups, and not just plaintiffs, an exemption from the 
government regulation would affect the State‟s interest of 
maintaining order at the state fair).  Joseph Giles, a Council 
member, testified that “for the sake of the common good and for 
the sake of the order of the business of the meeting,” the 
Council must remove persons who do not go through the normal 
process to address the Council.  App. at 62-63.  Regardless of 
how the Pennsylvania General Assembly supplemented free 
                                                                                                             
public forfeited all First Amendment rights once the public 
comment period ended.  Id. at 976; Id. at 979 (Kozinski, C.J., 
concurring) (“Even in a limited public forum like a city council 
meeting, the First Amendment tightly constrains the 
government‟s power; speakers may be removed only if they are 
actually disruptive.”).  But Norse, unlike this case, did not 
involve a situation in which the speaker injected himself into a 
public meeting at a time not provided for public participation by 
attempting to speak.  In Norse the City removed the member of 
the public for giving the salute, not for giving it at the wrong 
time.     
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speech rights when it enacted the Sunshine Act, the First 
Amendment simply does not require that all members of the 
public be permitted to voice objections to the Council‟s 
procedures any time they desire to do so.   
 We also point out that the District Court, without 
objection from Galena, presented the case to the jury under 
instructions that made the question of whether Galena was 
creating a disturbance on March 20, 2007, irrelevant to the 
issues on this appeal.  The Court told the jury to answer the 
question of whether Leone had Galena removed from the 
meeting with the intention of imposing reasonable restrictions 
on the time, place and manner of his speech so as to preserve the 
order and decorum of the meeting or whether Leone had him 
ejected based on Galena‟s message or identity.  This instruction 
did not inject a disturbance issue into the jury‟s consideration.  
Accordingly, this case is simply not a case in which the Court 
was dealing with a content-based restriction, the validity of 
which would depend on whether the speech, unless suppressed, 
might create a disturbance or cause unrest.   
 Clearly, the evidence required that the jury conclude that 
Leone was enforcing time, place and manner restrictions.  
Inasmuch as the restriction was reasonable and the evidence 
required a finding that Leone had the intent to enforce it without 
regard for whether Galena was creating a disturbance, the Court 
correctly granted Leone judgment as a matter of law as the 
propriety of the enforcement of the restrictions did not depend 
on whether Galena was creating a disturbance.  Indeed, Galena 
does not even contend in his brief that he objected when the 
Court did not charge the jury that should determine whether 
  55 
Galena had been creating a disturbance.  Thus, we are not 
concerned with an issue similar to the issue the Supreme Court 
faced in Terminiello. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 In sum, an analysis of all of the evidence in the record 
with regard to the March 20 confrontation demonstrates that 
Leone was enforcing a reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction on Galena‟s speech designed to ensure that the 
Council functioned for its intended purpose: i.e., being the 
legislative body of Erie County.  Like the District Court, we 
cannot find evidence in the record to support a reasonable 
inference that Leone ejected Galena from the March 20 Council 
meeting because of animus toward him or his message nor can 
we find evidence that Galena did not have an adequate 
alternative opportunity to state his objections to the Council‟s 
procedures.  Therefore, the Court properly vacated the jury 
verdict and granted Leone‟s motion for judgment as a matter of 
law.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s orders of 
March 5, 2010, vacating the jury verdict, granting judgment as a 
matter of law in favor of Leone, and denying Galena‟s motions 
for attorney‟s fees and costs.   
Daniel T. Galena v. Fiore Leone, No. 10-1914 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 My colleagues have presented a learned exegesis on 
First Amendment law which, if raised in a pretrial context, 
may well carry the day.  I differ because they fail (in my 
opinion) to give sufficient weight to yet another constitutional 
imperative – that grounded in the Seventh Amendment which 
requires judges to give higher weight to a jury’s interpretation 
to the facts than to their own predilections.  
 
 In this case, they affirm the District Court’s bold step 
overturning the jury’s verdict for allegedly insufficient 
evidence.  I respectfully dissent.  Drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, as is required, I 
believe the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s 
conclusion that Fiore Leone, the chairman of the Erie County 
Council, was motivated more by the content of Daniel 
Galena’s speech and/or his identity than by a desire to enforce 
a reasonable regulation.  See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-50 (2000).   
 
 Although Galena may have been speaking out of turn 
when he objected to the March 20, 2007 proceedings as 
violating the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act, it is undisputed that 
Leone’s reaction was extremely angry, indeed 
disproportionately so.  Meanwhile, Galena remained calm 
throughout.  Even the police officer who escorted Galena 
from the meeting testified that Leone was ―pretty animated . . 
. pounding the gavel,‖ while Galena was ―pretty calm 
throughout the whole ordeal.‖  App. at 56.  Another 
councilmember described the exchange as ―boisterous,‖ but 
said that Galena was not insulting, threatening, insolent, 
slanderous, or obscene.  Finally, Galena testified that Leone 
responded in a ―loud, angry tone.‖  App. at 38.   Although a 
jury would not be required to credit Galena’s testimony, it 
certainly was entitled to.  Even if the jury chose to ignore 
Galena’s testimony, the other testimony was consistent that 
Leone reacted in a loud, angry manner to Galena’s untimely 
objection.  The videotape of the exchange, which was played 
for the jury, supports that testimony.  Leone’s 
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disproportionate reaction gives rise to an inference that it was 
precipitated by something other than Galena’s miscue.  
 
 This conclusion is supported by our precedent.  In 
Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2006), 
we held that the District Court properly denied judgment as a 
matter of law when the defendant presiding officer removed 
another councilperson from a meeting.  In that case, as here, 
the plaintiff councilperson was interrupting the presiding 
officer and there was a valid time, place, and manner speech 
restriction in effect.  Id. at 403-05.  Notwithstanding, because 
the presiding officer responded in an emotionally charged, 
angry way and with personal attacks against the other 
councilperson, we held that a reasonable jury could find that 
the officer was motivated by the plaintiff’s speech or identity, 
not by a desire to enforce the otherwise valid regulation.  Id. 
at 405.  We also held that ―[t]he speed with which [the 
presiding officer] determined to eject [the plaintiff] from the 
meeting . . . could be viewed by a reasonable jury as 
evidence‖ that the officer was motivated by content and 
personal animosity, rather than a desire to maintain decorum.  
Id.  
 
Though the evidence of the presiding officer’s ill-
motive was perhaps stronger in Monteiro than it is here, 
Monteiro reinforces that the jury was entitled to infer from 
Leone’s anger and the speed with which he silenced Galena 
that he was impermissibly motivated.  Despite the factual 
similarity between Monteiro and this case, the majority does 
not persuasively distinguish its outcome.   
 
So swift was Leone’s retribution that Galena was 
hardly able to articulate the substance of his objection.  The 
majority characterizes Leone’s immediate sanction as 
evidence that the content of the speech did not motivate 
Leone.  While that is one way to view the evidence, that is 
certainly not the only way.  The jury could have reasonably 
inferred, as we held in Monteiro, that Leone acted swiftly 
because he knew, even if not the specific terms, at least the 
general tenor of Galena’s objection and attempted to 
preemptively silence him.  Such an inference is reasonable 
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given that Galena had been a frequent commentator at 
meetings, often raising arguments that Leone himself 
characterized as being criticisms of the council.  See App. at 
75 (Leone testified that Galena had previously criticized him 
for acting ―illegal[ly], as far as some of the issues were 
concerned, [Galena] said that a few times when he addressed 
Council.‖).  Even were such an inference not reasonable, the 
First Amendment protects restrictions based on the speaker’s 
identity; without question Leone knew that Galena was the 
speaker.   
  
Other evidence also supports the jury’s verdict.  For 
example, as outlined by the majority, after the public hearing 
portion of the March 20 meeting had concluded, Leone 
ominously warned three of the citizens who had spoken to be 
careful when they accused the council of breaking the law 
and commented ―[i]t seems like no matter what, some people 
cannot be pleased.‖  App. at 144-45.  Leone then warned 
people to ―be careful, because, if necessary, Council will take 
the matter to court.‖  App. at 145.  This warning appears to be 
content based—Leone was tired of being accused by 
constituents of breaking the law and threatened to take them 
to court if they continued to do so.  It is hardly a comment 
one would expect from a neutral presider. 
 
 The jury could have reasonably concluded that when 
Leone silenced Galena, Leone was grouping him with the 
other constituents whom he had first threatened.  The jury 
could have viewed Leone’s conduct as motivated by his 
anticipation that Galena’s speech would be critical of him.  
As noted, Leone testified that in the past Galena had accused 
him of acting illegally, the same type of accusation that 
prompted Leone to issue his warning on March 20, 2007.  
Indeed, on March 20 Galena was again accusing Leone of 
acting ultra vires, in contravention of the Pennsylvania 
Sunshine Law (an objection which, according to the 
transcript, Galena was barely able to utter before he was 
ejected).  See App. at 148.  Additional evidence indicating 
that Leone was grouping Galena with the other constituents is 
the fact that as Galena was being escorted out of the room, 
Leone shouted, asking ―Anyone else want to go?‖  See 
4 
 
Galena v. Leone, 711 F. Supp. 2d 440, 447 (W.D. Pa. 2010).  
The majority opinion does not discuss this fact.  
 
 The fact that Leone threatened Galena with 
―harassment‖ charges as he ejected Galena, ostensibly 
because Galena accused the council of acting illegally, further 
supports the jury’s conclusion that Leone was motivated by 
the content of Galena’s speech.  At trial, Leone attempted to 
explain this threat away, testifying that he more or less meant 
―disorderly conduct.‖  App. at 110.  But the jury was not 
required to credit that explanation.  As the factfinder charged 
with making credibility determinations, it appears they did 
not.  The Supreme Court has instructed that we are not to 
second guess such credibility determinations.  Reeves, 530 
U.S. at 150. 
 
 On that same note, the majority appears to credit 
Leone’s testimony that he was merely enforcing a provision 
of the Erie Administrative Code, which he understood to 
allow public participation only during the public hearing 
portion of the meeting.  However, as outlined above, there are 
numerous facts—Leone’s anger, swift response, and content-
based threats—from which a jury could have rejected Leone’s 
testimony and concluded that procedural stewardship was not 
his motive.   
 
 Finally, the majority emphasizes that Galena had 
spoken at meetings many times in the past, and Leone had, 
for the most part, allowed him and other persistent objectors 
to speak.  Viewed in this light, this historical relationship is 
helpful for Leone.  But the history reveals another side.  
Namely, Leone had a track record of reacting negatively 
towards Galena: scowling, grimacing, and laughing at 
Galena’s comments.  Notwithstanding Leone’s failure to have 
silenced Galena in the past, the jury could have inferred from 
Leone’s past behavior that he had a growing disdain for 
Galena and his comments.  The jury could have concluded 
that the disdain reached a boiling point at the March 20, 2007 
meeting and that Leone silenced Galena because of the 
content of his speech and/or his identity.    
5 
 
In sum, the jury was entitled to conclude that Leone 
was motivated impermissibly by Galena’s speech content 
and/or his identity.  We should be hesitant to override the 
jury’s judgment with our own.  I would affirm the jury 
verdict.    
